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ABSTRACT
In this study I specify econometric models that test the hypothesis that income
distribution affects innovation. The econometric results suggest that countries with more equal
income distribution spend more on innovative activity, produce more innovative outputs, and are
more productive in producing innovations than those with less equal income distribution. Other
significant determinants of innovation include income level, the size of economic activity, and
population density.
However, my findings indicate that the effects of income distribution on innovation are
limited to developing countries. Income distribution, the size of economic activity, and
population density significantly affect innovation expenditures only in developing countries.
Income level affects R&D expenditures in both developed and developing countries. Regarding
the determinants of innovation output level, income distribution affects only developing
countries, whereas the size of economic activity affects both developed and developing
countries. Income level is not a significant factor in determining the level of innovation output.
As for innovation productivity, income level is significant for both developed and developed
countries, while income distribution and population density affect only developing countries.
The size of economic activity is not a significant determinant of innovation productivity.
Income distribution has an effect only on developing countries, because knowledge and
information, the essence of innovation, have the properties of increasing returns to scale due to
externalities, and increasing marginal productivity. Income distribution affects innovation
expenditure, innovation output, and innovation productivity by affecting the aggregate demand
composition and human-capital accumulation. Because the market size and the stock of human
capital are relatively small in developing countries, income distribution has significant effects on
the size of market, the stock of human capital, and therefore innovation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Income distribution and technological innovations are two of the most important issues in
the field of economic development. Many analysts have proposed economic theories and
conducted empirical studies on both issues, particularly with regard to their relationships with
economic growth. Income distribution plays a crucial role in many of the development models,
from those of earlier economists, such as Kuznets (1955) and Kaldor (1957), to the more recent
ones, such as Galor and Zeira (1993) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994). It is now widely accepted
that income distribution affects economic development through various channels, such as
imperfect capital and credit markets and redistributive policy.
Technological innovations, on the other hand, have long been considered as the engine of
economic development. Although the reference to technological progress is implicit in the
writings of earlier economists, such as Adam Smith and Karl Marx, it was Schumpeter (1934)
who first explicitly regarded innovation as the key determinant of economic growth. Since then,
many economists have incorporated technological innovation into their analyses of economic
growth, particularly in the recent literature of endogenous-growth models (e.g., Arrow 1962;
Romer 1986; Grossman and Helpman 1991).
If income distribution indeed affects the economic development process, and innovation
plays a crucial role in economic development, then a causal relationship is possible between
income distribution and technological innovation. Given the substantial amount of interest in
both issues, it is surprising that few analysts have proposed theoretical models that explain the
causal relationships between income distribution and innovation, let alone conducted an
empirical study to test their relationships. Even among the more recent analysts, most tend to
focus on the impact of technological innovation on income distribution (e.g., Lawrence and
Slaughter 1993). To the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical study that investigates the
issue of how income distribution affects technological innovations.
In light of the foregoing observation, I test empirically the causal relationship between
income distribution and technological innovation (hereafter innovation). Specifically, I examine
whether income distribution affects the amount of investment on innovative activities, innovation
outputs, and innovative productivity. I also examine whether the effects are the same between
developed and developing countries.
My main hypothesis is that countries with more equal income distribution are more
innovative than those countries with unequal income distribution. More specifically, I
hypothesize that countries with more equal income distribution spend more on innovative
activities, produce more innovative outputs, and are more productive in producing innovations
than those with less equal income distribution.
Income distribution can affect innovation through several mechanisms. First, income
distribution affects the aggregate demand and production composition, thus affecting the
investment incentives of the entrepreneurs. Second, in the presence of credit-market
imperfections, income distribution affects entrepreneurs' access to credits for investment,
financial-sector development, occupational choices, relative profit margins, and human-capital
accumulation. The third mechanism is one of redistributive policy, which affects firm size and
market structure. Due to data availability, in this study, I test only two mechanisms through
which income distribution may affect innovation: namely, financial-sector development, and
credit-markets imperfection.
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I establish the theoretical framework for
the empirical analysis of the impact of income distribution on innovation. First, I briefly review
the concepts and characteristics of income distribution and innovation, focusing on the impact of
income distribution on economic indicators that may determine the rates and directions of
innovation. I then propose the possible mechanisms through which income distribution may
affect innovation.
Within the conceptual framework, I describe and explain in Chapter 3 the methodology,
variables, and data that I use for the regression analysis. I also discuss other possible
determinants of innovations, which are used as the control variables. I then present the estimated
results. In the concluding chapter, I examine some of the broader lessons and limitations that
emerge from the analysis.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, I establish the theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of the
impact of income distribution on innovation. In the first section, I briefly review the concepts of
income distribution and innovation, focusing on the impact of income distribution on economic
indicators that may determine the rate and directions of innovation. In the second section, I
review the theoretical models that investigate the impact of income distribution on innovation.
Based on these reviews, I then propose the possible mechanisms through which income
distribution may affect innovation.
I. INCOME DISTRIBUTION
In this section, I review the basic concepts of income distribution and the mechanisms
through which income distribution affects economic development.
1. Basic concepts of income distribution
Philosophers have debated the definition of equality for centuries. At the metaphysical
level, the notions of equality can be categorized into two distinct groups of meanings. In the
first, equality signifies justice or fair treatment. In the second, equality indicates sameness or
homogeneity. Equality as justice is a normative statement regarding the relations between
persons, whereas equality as sameness is a positive statement of fact, postulating the common
characteristics among people. The concept of equality stretches far beyond the realm of
economics to include other related notions such as lifetimes, basic capability, and political
freedoms (See Sen 1999 for detailed discussions).
At the level of economics, the concept of equality and distribution concerns the material
choices the individual has, as compared with other individuals. Depending on the context,
distribution may refer to the distribution of the asset stocks or the distribution of the income
flows. It may refer to the distribution from a short-term perspective, e.g., income distribution at
any one point in time, or from a long-term perspective, e.g., distribution of lifetime income.
Furthermore, there is a distinction between functional and personal income distribution.
Functional income distribution is the distribution of the returns to different factors of production,
namely labor and capital. Personal income distribution, on the other hand, refers to the returns
that are funneled to households. The knowledge of how income is earned by households tells us
about the relationship between income distribution and other features of development, such as
innovation and growth. In this study, I limit the analysis within the realm of economics, focusing
on the personal distribution of income at one point in time.
2. Income distribution and economic development
The issue of income distribution has been of great interest to economists for many years.
The vast literature on income distribution and development can be categorized into two groups,
according to the two possible types of causalities: i.e., one that focuses on the effect of economic
growth on income distribution, and the other on the effect of distribution on growth.
The recent interest in the effects of income distribution on economic development started
with a classic paper by Kuznets (1955). In the paper, Kuznets argues that income distribution is
more equal at low levels of income in the early stages of development, then becomes more
unequal as development proceeds, and eventually becomes equal again as countries approach the
income level of the developed countries. The Kuznets hypothesis of this U-shaped curve has
since been a major topic for debate among economists. Many analysts have investigated the
Kuznets inverted U-shape curve, relating the levels of income per capita to income distribution.
Although some economists have found supporting evidence for the Kuznets hypothesis (e.g.,
Paukert 1973), the consensus seems to be developing in recent years that the parabolic
relationship between income inequality and income level is weak (e.g., Anand and Kanpur 1993;
Bourguignon 1995; Deininger and Squire 1998).
My interest in the effect of income distribution on innovation fits into the other group of
literature, which examines how income distribution affects growth. I categorize the substantial
literature on the issue into two broad approaches. The two approaches are distinguished by their
conflicting predictions and their differing explanations of the mechanisms through which
distribution affects growth. One is the classical approach, which argues that inequality stimulates
capital accumulation, and thus promotes economic growth. The other is the modem approach,
which argues, in contrast, that equality can stimulate investment in human capital, and hence
economic growth. The modem approach focuses on two key issues, namely, capital-market
imperfections, and the political economy of inequality.
3. Income distribution and savings
The classical approach to explaining the effects of income distribution on economic
growth was originated by Adam Smith (1776) and was further developed by Keynes (1920),
Lewis (1954), and more recently Bourguignon (1981). The basis for this approach is the
observation that saving rates of the rich are higher than those of the poor. Because of inequality,
limited resources are channeled towards those whose marginal propensity to save is higher. This
process increases aggregate savings, capital accumulation, and investment. As suggested by the
Harrod-Domar and Solow growth models, the rate of savings affects the long-run level of per
capita income, and, in some cases, the rate of economic growth. Recently, Smith (2001) finds the
empirical evidence that income distribution affects the private saving rate in both industrialized
and developing countries.
4. Income distribution and credit-market imperfections
Credit market imperfection is another approach to understanding the impact of income
distribution on economic development. Galor and Zeira (1993) argue that in the presence of
credit markets imperfection, and a fixed up-front investment required for human capital
accumulation, the initial income distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment,
and thus economic development. This statement is based on the observation that an individual's
collateral, i.e., her existing wealth, determines the degree to which she can have access to the
credit market. In an unequal society in which many people do not have access to credit markets,
poor people cannot accumulate enough wealth to cover the fixed cost of human capital.
5. Income distribution and political economy
Another approach to the effect of income distribution on growth includes the studies that
relate income inequality to political pressure for redistributive policies. Persson and Tabellini
(1994) show both theoretically and empirically that there is a significant relationship between
inequality and economic growth. Their explanation is that inequality leads to policies that do not
guarantee property rights and do not allow full private appropriation of returns from investment.
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) also find that the greater the inequality of wealth and income,
the higher the rate of taxation, and the lower the rate of growth. Their basic argument is that in a
society where a large section of the population does not have access to productive resources,
there is a strong pressure for redistribution. Instead of redistributing the existing stock of wealth,
many governments resort to taxing the increments to the stock of wealth. This type of taxation
tends to reduce the rate of investment and therefore the rate of economic growth. Similarly,
Alesina and Perotti (1996) examine the relationship between income inequality, socio-political
instability, and investment. They also conclude that inequality affects investment and economic
growth.
6. A unified view
It is clear that the classical and modem approaches lead to conflicting predictions as to
how income distribution affects economic growth. Some economists attempt to reconcile both
approaches by re-defining the process of economic development. Galor and Moav (1999)
propose an alternative approach to the issue. They argue that the replacement of physical capital
accumulation by human capital accumulation as a prime engine of growth has changed the
qualitative effect of income distribution on the process of development. A unified approach, as
Galor (2000) puts it, holds that both classical and modem explanations could be true, depending
on the stages of development. Inequality may have a positive effect on the process of
development in early stages of development when physical accumulation is the engine of
economic growth. In contrast, when human capital accumulation becomes crucial to economic
development, equality has a positive impact on economic growth.
II. INNOVATION
In this section, I review the literature on the definition, the properties, and the
determinants of innovation.
1. Definition of innovation
Although the word "innovation" has been used for some time, the use of the word in
economics was relatively recent. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, Joseph
Schumpeter was the first person who used the word to refer positively to the creative
introduction of useful improvement. His concept of innovation includes "(1) the introduction of a
new good ... (2) the introduction of the new method of production ... (3) the opening of a new
market ... (4) the opening of a new source of supply ... (5) the carrying out of the new
organization of any industry, like the creation of a monopoly position" (Schumpeter 1934, p. 66).
Clearly, his concept of innovation includes both technological and organizational considerations.
In this study, however, I focus only on technological innovation.
Innovation can be categorized as process innovation and product innovation. Process
innovation is aimed at reducing the cost of producing existing goods. In other words, it is the
deliberate effort to change the relationship between factor input proportions used by a firn to
produce a given type and/or level of output. On the other hand, product innovation is aimed at
inventing completely new commodities. Furthermore, according to the relationship of the newly
invented products to the existing ones, innovative products are vertically related when they have
similar functions to the existing goods but have better quality. On the other hand, new products
are horizontally related when they have new functions, thereby expanding the variety in
consumption or specialization in production.
2. Properties of Innovations
Innovations, like technology in its broad definition, are essentially information- and
knowledge-based assets. Information and knowledge have some unique properties as an
economic commodity, which may explain the determinants and effects of innovations in
economic processes. As first argued by Arrow (1962) and later refined by Romer (1990),
information has the property of a quasi-public good; that is, it is non-rival and partially non-
excludable. It is non-rival, in that when one person uses certain information and knowledge to
produce a good, this action does not preclude others from doing so, even simultaneously. It is
partially non-excludable, in that the owners of the information sometimes find it difficult to
prevent others from using it without compensation, even with legal protection of their intellectual
property rights. The degree of excludability varies upon the policy choices of each society, which
determines the duration and scope of protection, as well as the enforcement of the related laws.
The difficulty arises precisely because information and knowledge are intangible, and thus are
harder to secure.
The partial excludability of knowledge creates the possibility of technological spillovers
generated by industrial R&D. According to Grossman and Helpman (1991), technological
spillovers occur when (1) firms can acquire information created by others without compensating
for it through market transaction, and (2) the creators or owners of the information have no
effective recourse, if other firms utilize the information so acquired. Technological spillovers as
a type of externalities may stimulate further innovation. This process is self-perpetuating, since
investment in creating new knowledge stimulates further knowledge spillovers, which in turn
create still more knowledge.
The property of partial excludability leads to another unique characteristic of knowledge
and innovation. When new knowledge is used as a factor of production, the production of goods
from the increased knowledge exhibits increasing returns to scale. In other words, knowledge
demonstrates increasing marginal productivity. However, as shown by Romer (1990) in his
endogenous growth model, when new knowledge itself is the objective of an R&D investment,
the "knowledge production" exhibits diminishing returns. That is, a doubling of innovative
investment will not produce double knowledge.
High initial costs in creating an innovation also lead to increasing returns to scale. In
industries such as computer software, biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, frmns spend
a large proportion of their expenditure on research and development before they can actually sell
a product innovation. Once the innovation is sold in the market, the marginal costs of producing
an additional unit of innovation is very low. With the protection of intellectual property rights
through patents, innovators can take advantage of the temporary monopoly by charging a price
that exceeds it marginal costs of production.
These unique properties of information, knowledge, and innovation are important in
understanding the determinants of innovation. They are also crucial to my attempting to establish
the causal relationship between income distribution and innovation in the following chapter.
3. Determinants of Innovations
The literature is vast on the determinants of innovation. The foci and approaches vary
greatly, from fin-level and industry-level studies to individual-country and cross-country
studies. This study is primarily concerned with the determinants of innovation at the national
level, so that I adopt a cross-country comparison as the methodology. Nevertheless, it is
important to understand the determinants of innovation at the firm level, because it is at the firm
level where innovations are actually produced.
The variables investigated at the firm and industry levels range from firm characteristics,
such as firm size, corporate governance system, and investment strategies (e.g., Cockburn and
Henderson 1996; Morck and Yeung 2001), to market characteristics and types of industries (e.g.,
Schumpeter 1942; Scherer 1982). The debate revolves around the issue of optimum firm sizes
for innovation and monopoly power in the industry. I discuss this issue later in detail in the
section where I explore the effect of income distribution on redistributive policy, which, in turn,
affects firm size and market structure.
At the macro-level, variables include institutional variables, such as property-right
systems; policy variables, such as industrial and technology policies; and even non-economic
variables, such as national cultures and religions (e.g., Rosenberg 1994). Furthermore, urban and
regional economists have recognized the role of agglomeration economies in promoting
innovation, because of knowledge spillovers between firms (e.g., Romer 1986; Porter 1990) or
the existence of a pool of skilled labor (Henderson 1986). Some analysts have studied the effect
of the agglomeration on economic growth (e.g., Glaeser et al. 1992; Gray and Markusen 1996).
There is a long debate in the innovation literature about the relative importance of
"market pull" versus "technology push" in determining the rate and direction of innovation.
Early analysts on the sources of technological change considered scientific discoveries as the
primary source behind innovation. Scientific advances were regarded as the outcomes of
intellectual pursuits of scientists, whose motivation was purely the passion for novel knowledge,
not the possible business profits. This scientific basis for innovation therefore removed
innovative activities from the realm of economic analysis. Usher (1954) represented this school
of thought, considering "invention" as a result of an "act of insight" going beyond the practice of
normal skills.
Some economists, however, take a different view. Joseph Schumpeter (1939)
distinguishes his concept of innovation from that of invention, saying that "innovation is possible
without anything we should identify as invention, and invention does not necessarily induce
innovation." (p. 84) He believes that innovations are driven by the "businessman's hunt for
profits." (Schumpeter 1942, p. 110) Schumpeter's argument is in line with the hypothesis that
profit maximization is the most important motive for fmns.
Although the argument seems plausible, quantitative evidence has been scarce on the
robustness of the connection between profits and expenditure on research and development
(R&D). One empirical study that confmns Schumpeter's argument is that of Schmookler (1966).
In his extensive study of important inventions in petroleum refining, paper making, railroading,
and farming, Schmookler shows that the stimulus for innovation is the need to solve costly
problems in production processes, or the desire to seize potentially profitable opportunities. In
his view, it is the expected profitability of inventive activity that determines the pace and
direction of industrial innovation.
Similarly, a recent study by Scherer (2001) confirms the linkage between profitability
and R&D spending at the firm and industry levels in the pharmaceutical sector. According to
Scherer, profitability and investments in R&D are linked in three distinct ways. First, successful
research and development leads, with some time lags, to new products. Depending on the
reception of the market, the new products could add to firm profits. Second, the profits earned by
a company serve as a source of funding for R&D. Third, the expectation of managers for future
profit opportunities can exert a demand-pull influence on R&D investment.
Other analysts have reconciled the arguments regarding the sources of innovation.
According to Mowery and Rosenberg (1989), scientific discovery plays a great role in the
process of technological innovation, but it takes considerable time before new scientific
knowledge can become innovations. New discoveries that come out of pure research need
additional applied research before they could become the economically useful knowledge.
Similarly, Dosi (1988) contends that industrial innovations are the results of the interactions
between technological opportunities created by scientific discoveries, inducements for applied
research that emerge from market opportunities, and private appropriability of the benefits of
innovation.
According to Dosi, many market-related factors could induce and determine the rate and
direction of innovation. These factors are, for instance, the levels and changes of demand
(market size and growth, and income elasticities of the various products), and the levels and
changes in relative prices, particularly the relative price of labor to that of machines and the price
of energy.
In this study, I limit the analysis within the realm of economics. I consider profits as the
key stimulus to, and source of funding for, research and development, which, in turn, leads to
innovative products and processes. It is profits that lure entrepreneurs to invest in innovative
activity. This is the conceptual basis for the empirical analyses in the following chapter.
III. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INNOVATION
The literature I have reviewed suggests that income distribution can affect savings,
investment, risk bearing, and the composition of demand and production. In this section, I extend
what I have learned from the literature and propose the possible mechanisms through which
income distribution may affect investment on innovation, innovative output, and its productivity.
Three broad categories of mechanisms are possible. The first mechanism affects the demand and
production composition, thus affecting the investment incentives of the entrepreneurs. Second, in
the presence of credit-market imperfections, income distribution affects entrepreneurs' access to
credits for investment, financial-sector development, occupational choices, relative profit
margins, and human-capital accumulation. The third mechanism is one of redistributive policy,
which affects firm size and market structure.
1. Demand Composition, Market Size, and Profits
Income determines not only the level of consumption, but also its composition or pattern.
According to Engel's Law, the different categories of consumption do not increase
proportionally to income. When income rises, the share of basic items in total consumption tends
to fall. For instance, at low levels of income, basic needs for food and clothing determine the
consumption patterns. Once people become richer, these basic needs are saturated, and demand
shifts to other categories of consumption. People demand goods of higher quality and
sophistication. In other words, the systems of demand are not homothetic but hierarchical.
Demand composition is one of the channels through which income distribution affects
innovation. If the individual's demand pattern depends on her income, the patterns of market
demand for different products should vary with the income distribution in a society as well. A
unique pattern of income distribution in a society means its overall pattern of expenditure and
demand is different from that of other societies. Furthermore, because the different products
demanded by consumers have to be produced and supplied, different demand patterns suggest
that different products are sold in the market. In short, different patterns of income distribution
lead to different demand compositions, thus different types of products supplied in the markets.
How does income distribution affect innovation through demand composition? As
Baldwin (1956) and North (1959) have pointed out, extreme concentration of wealth among the
rich results in the demand for handmade and imported luxury goods rather than for domestic
manufactures. In other words, unequal income distribution means that there are not many rich
and middle-class people who can afford innovative goods. Baland and Ray (1991) show a
situation in which unequal assets distribution results in a high demand for luxury goods by the
rich, as compared with basic goods.
As reviewed earlier, innovations require high front-end investment, which needs large
markets to break even. Income distribution affects the level of demand and the market size for
innovations. Here, I interpret unequal income distribution to mean that there are a great number
of poor people and few rich people. This makes innovations less profitable, because the size of
the market is smaller in the early stage of production. Lower profit margins then reduce
entrepreneurs' incentives to invest in innovative activity.
A few analysts theoretically examine demand composition as the channel through which
income distribution becomes a determinant of innovation. Falkinger (1994) presents an Engelian
growth model in which income distribution affects product development, when consumers have
hierarchic preferences. Although his model considers the effects of income distribution on
product demand, it does not regard horizontal product differentiation as innovation. Horizontal
product differentiation here refers to product innovation that leads only to new brands of
essentially the same goods. In the Falkinger model, product innovation leads to new products
based on vertical product differentiation, where in each category of demand the existing products
are substituted by new ones of better quality. In addition, he also considers a more fundamental
type of innovation, i.e., the development of new categories of demand.
Similarly, Zweimuller (2000) develops an innovation-driven growth model that captures
the effect of income distribution on innovation, with the assumption of hierarchic preferences. In
this model, income distribution affects the incentives to innovate by affecting not only the level,
but also the growth, of demand for innovator's products. The model suggests that societies that
are more equal and have higher economic growth will be more innovative.
In both the Falinger and Zweimuller models, income distribution affects the demand but
does not impact the prices of new goods. Other analysts have developed models that take into
account the prices of new products. For example, Glass (1999) shows that when consumers'
valuation of quality improvement varies, depending upon their income levels, income inequality
can affect the willingness to pay for quality. Income distribution affects the equilibrium price
structure among goods of different qualities, which, in turn, affects the profit incentives to
innovate. His model suggests that in an unequal society, there are few rich consumers who value
new products of high quality, and the profit incentives for quality improvement, i.e., innovation,
are low. As a result, the rate of innovation is lower than when income distribution is more equal.
How is this related to the investment and production of innovation? In a society in which
income inequality is low, there is a large middle-class population who are the natural consumers
of manufacturers. This implies a strong market for each of the products demanded. On the other
hand, in a society where income distribution is very unequal, the demand for manufactures is
low. The poor demand and can afford only basic products, while the rich demand luxury items.
In this case, although the range of goods demanded is wide, the quantity demanded for each
individual good is limited.
Income distribution affects innovation in a similar way to how it affects industrialization.
Murphy et al. (1989) show that the adoption of efficient production methods, i.e., process
innovation, requires large markets. In addition to a large population, homogeneous tastes, and
concentrated population, income distribution also affects industrialization, as it affects the
composition of demand and market sizes for manufactures.
In short, when income is highly concentrated among the rich, the initial market for a new
product is small. When a high proportion of consumers are poor, it takes a long time for the
market size for the new product to enlarge. This reduces the expected profitability of the product,
thereby reducing the entrepreneurs' incentives to invest in innovative activity.
The issue of an open economy
The assumption of a closed economy underlies the discussion of the demand effects of
income distribution. Most countries, however, are open to some international trade. A question
then arises as to whether the demand composition effects of the domestic income distribution are
still relevant. I contend that the hypothesis is still valid, as domestic demand composition has an
impact on the pattern of trade, thus the domestic production of goods.
According to the Linder hypothesis, named after Burenstam Linder (1961), foreign trade
is the extension of domestic production and consumption. The set of exports of an economy must
be a subset of goods domestically demanded. In other words, the necessary condition for any
manufactured good to be an export is that it be demanded for domestic consumption. According
to Chenery et al. (1987), the domestic markets for developing countries account for 80-90
percent of their manufacturing outputs.
The reason lies in the need on the producer's part for knowledge about demand and
consumer preferences. According to Linder, domestic entrepreneurs base their production
decisions on proximate profit opportunities. They need the knowledge about the needs and
preferences of consumers, which are harder to acquire in the case of exports to foreign
consumers. This hypothesis applies to the discussion of income distribution and entrepreneurs'
incentives to innovate. The assumption that domestic manufacturers first consider the domestic
markets in their investment decisions is applicable to the case of innovation.
2. Imperfections of Capital and Credit Markets
There are several ways in which income distribution may affect innovation through
imperfect capital and credit markets: namely (1) lack of collateral for investment; (2)
development of financial markets; (3) occupational choices; (4) relative profit margins; and (5)
human capital accumulation.
2.1 Lack of collateral for investment
As reviewed earlier, a common mechanism through which income distribution affects
macroeconomic variables is imperfect credit markets. Under extreme inequality, many people
are prevented from borrowing against their future income, because a minimum level of income
or collateral is required of all borrowers. In such a case, the initial income distribution affects the
pattern of investment in human capital, subsequent aggregate output, and hence economic
growth. As an extension of this argument, I contend that credit-markets imperfection is also a
mechanism through which income inequality affects innovation.
In an unequal society, many potential entrepreneurs do not have access to credits that
they could use to invest in innovative activity. Only the rich have access to them. When capital
markets are imperfect and there are fixed up-front costs required for the production of
innovation, investors in innovative activities are limited to those people who have enough
existing wealth. The rich entrepreneurs could either use their existing wealth or borrow from
banks to fund innovative projects. In contrast, potential entrepreneurs with limited asset stocks
can neither fund the innovative projects by themselves nor borrow from the credit markets
because they lack collateral. As a result, the overall investment in innovative activity and the rate
of innovation are low.
2.2 Development offinancial sector
Income inequality may also affect the development of domestic financial markets, which,
in turn, affects technological innovation. As shown empirically by Li et al. (1998), a developed
financial market eases the access of the poor to credit, thereby reducing income inequality.
However, little is known whether income distribution indeed affects the development of financial
markets. Given the importance of income distribution and financial markets in the economic
development discourse, it is surprising that there is very little literature on how income
distribution affects financial market development.
Many economists have shown that a well-functioning financial market is crucial to
innovation and economic growth. Schumpeter (1911) argues that "The banker authorizes people,
in the name of the society as it were, to ... [innovate]" (p. 74). In other words, the appropriate
allocation of capital made possible by efficient and flexible financial markets is important for
innovative activity. The services, such as mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, managing
risks, and facilitating transactions, provided by financial intermediaries are essential for
technological innovation. King and Levine (1993a) empirically test the argument and find that
there is a strong relationship between a country's level of financial-sector development and
indicators for economic performance, such as real per capita GDP growth, physical capital
accumulation, and economic efficiency.
An explanation for why developed financial markets foster innovation is related to the
issue of risk allocation. According to Arrow (1964), investors are willing to take more risks in a
well-functioning financial market, as risks are spread across many investors. I extend this
argument further to argue that an innovation investment is usually associated with risks, and that
investors consider the level of risks when deciding whether to finance it. A well-developed
financial market can spread both the actual risks and the risks perceived by investors, thus
promoting innovative activities.
This view is well captured within the framework of endogenous technological change.
King and Levine (1993b) construct an endogenous growth model in which financial systems
evaluate prospective entrepreneurs, mobilize savings to finance the most promising productivity-
improving activities, diversify the risks associated with these innovative activities, and reveal the
expected profits from engaging in innovation rather than the production of existing goods using
existing methods. They find that better financial systems improve the probability of successful
innovation and thereby accelerate economic growth. On the other hand, financial-sector
distortions reduce the rate of economic growth by reducing the rate of innovation.
2.3 Occupational choices
Income distribution may also affect the occupational structure of the economy and the
organizational form of production. Banerjee and Newman (1993) develop a model in which the
distribution of wealth affects the occupational choice and economic development. They argue
that because of capital-market imperfections, poor people have no choice but to work for a wage
rather than to be self-employed, while rich people can become entrepreneurs. These occupational
decisions then determine the wage rate of the economy, which leads to a new distribution of
wealth. The entire process then repeats itself. Simply put, the initial distribution of wealth
determines the number of people who become entrepreneurs, as well as the number of people
who become hired workers or join the subsistence sector.
According to the model, in a society with highly unequal income distribution, there is a
large supply of labor at any wage exceeding subsistence levels. These people are too poor to
have access to credits and hence cannot become entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the demand
for labor is low at any wage rate. The wage rate at equilibrium is thus at the minimum
subsistence wage. In contrast, the profits are high for those who can become entrepreneurs.
On the other hand, if a society has an equal income distribution, relatively few people are
barred from access to credit markets, and more people can become entrepreneurs. These people
enter the labor market only when wages are high enough to lure them from becoming
entrepreneurs.
The model shows that income distribution determines the number of entrepreneurs in a
society. I extend the model to explain the effects of income distribution on innovation. Because
these entrepreneurs are practically investors in innovative activity, I assume that innovation is the
function of the number of entrepreneurs. In other words, the total number of entrepreneurs
affects the level of innovation in a society. In a country with great income inequality, there are
fewer entrepreneurs than there would be with lower inequality. Fewer entrepreneurs therefore
mean fewer innovations. Thus, income distribution affects the number of entrepreneurs, and
hence innovation investment and the number of innovations.
2.4 Human capital accumulation
As innovation is essentially knowledge and information, the quality and quantity of
human capital available in a country is undoubtedly another important determinant of innovation.
The general hypothesis is that the more and better human capital a country has, the more it can
innovate. Among several economists who investigate the issue, Roy (1997) shows theoretically
how the quality of human capital affects innovation and long-run economic growth. Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1997) also show that human capital stock, as measured by number of personnel in
R&D and level of educational achievement, influences investments in fixed capital and R&D.
Unequal income distribution also implies unequal access to knowledge. Because
innovation is essentially knowledge and information, I hypothesize that income inequality affects
the accumulation process of knowledge and human capital, the number of personnel in research
and development, and thus the rate of innovation. I base this hypothesis on the assumptions of
hierarchical demand composition and imperfect credit markets for education.
As discussed earlier, income distribution affects the composition of aggregate demand
for good and services, as well as the demand for and the returns to labor of different skill levels.
For example, under high inequality, there is a low demand for goods and services produced by
medium-skilled labor. This presses down the returns to medium-skilled labor, while returns are
skewed in favor of high-skilled labor. In most developing countries, where there are no credit
markets for education. Poor people therefore do not have access to the education to equip them
with higher-level skills. Furthermore, in the long run, the poor will not be able to fund the
education for their children, as they will not be able to bequeath enough wealth for them.
This is another channel through which income distribution affects innovation, assuming
that innovations require minimum levels of skills and knowledge and that the total number of
personnel in R&D affects the rate of innovation. Under these assumptions, the higher the
inequality in a society, the fewer people with skills and knowledge, thus the lower the rate of
innovation.
A related issue is the concentration of employment in certain sectors that may produce
more innovations than others. Leamer et al. (1999) find that countries that have low Gini-
coefficients tend to have more employment in manufacturing than those countries with high
Gini-coefficients. This is particularly true for human-capital-intensive sectors such as chemicals,
and printing and paper. I can extend their conclusion to fit into my hypothesis that income
distribution affects innovation. Assuming that innovations are produced in the manufacturing
sector, large manufacturing sectors could lead to more innovations.
2.5 Relative profits margin across sectors
Income inequality, together with the differences in the rates of returns across sectors due
to capital-market imperfections, lead to the concentration of investment in the sectors that are not
innovative.
In a standard neoclassical investment model with the premise of profit maximization, the
investment decision is based on the comparison between the present values of all costs and
revenues. Corporate executives invest only when the net present value of the project in question
exceeds zero. When there is more than one project to compare, investors choose the project with
the highest rate of return.
This simple principle also applies to the investment decision on innovative activity.
Taking into account the opportunities and risks associated with the new investment, investors are
faced with two investment options: either investing in the existing products and/or processes, or
investing in innovative activity. If the rates of returns of the existing products are higher than
those of the new products, i.e., innovations, entrepreneurs will not invest in innovative activity.
They are already satisfied with the profits that they can earn from existing production. On the
other hand, if these entrepreneurs see potentially high profits from innovations, they will invest
in research and development for product and process improvement.
Income distribution can affect innovation, precisely because it affects the perceived rates
of returns for innovation relative to the existing products and/or processes. Under imperfect
capital markets, the rates of returns to investment vary across sectors. With highly skewed
income distribution, the variance is even greater. Wealth is concentrated in the hands of the few
rich, who invest in the sectors that would give them the highest returns. In countries with high
income inequality, businesses are not very diversified and capital is concentrated in only a few
sectors. This phenomenon is particularly true when the rates of returns for investment in existing
businesses are higher than the expected rates of returns from new businesses.
Learner et al. (1999) conduct a cross-sectional empirical analysis to demonstrate that
natural-resource-intensive sectors, particularly agriculture, absorb capital that might otherwise
flow to manufacturing. This depresses workers' incentive to accumulate skills and delays
industrialization. In most Latin American countries, capital is concentrated in natural-resource
sectors. With the extreme concentration of wealth and imperfect capital markets, capital owners-
cum-entrepreneurs are likely to choose natural-resource sectors over manufacturing, because the
expected rates of returns are higher in natural-resource sectors.
Differences in rates of returns across sectors, combined with skewed income distribution,
therefore affect innovation. This argument seems plausible particularly when the existing
industries are natural-resource intensive and the new industries are manufacturing. Given that
innovations occur more in the manufacturing industries than in the natural-resource-based
industries, less investment in manufacturing industries is likely to result in fewer innovations.
I can further develop this argument in terms of a Schumpeterian growth model, in which
innovation plays a central role. Again, profits are considered as the attraction to motivate
innovative activity, as well as the vehicle by which successful innovators grow relative to other
firms. Competition is a dynamic process in which fmns deliberately attempt to be leaders in
technological innovations, so as to earn supra-normal profits from successful innovations. With
the protection of intellectual property rights, innovators can gain high entrepreneurial rents.
However, in an unequal society, entrepreneurs already earn high profits, regardless of the
innovative capability of the firms. In other words, firms can sell their products in the domestic
markets by utilizing their existing market power, without innovating, and still earn high profits.
Limited dynamic competition among fmns thus results in low rates of innovation in the overall
economy.
3. Redistributive Policy and Firm Size
Income distribution may also have an effect on the sizes of domestic firms, which, in
turn, affect the rate of innovation. In order to prove this argument as one mechanism for income
distribution to affect innovation, I need to establish the relationships between innovation and
firm size, and between income distribution and frmn size.
Many economists have studied firm size and market structure as the determinants of
innovation. The debate dates back to 1942 when Schumpeter argued that large firms with a
considerable degree of market power would be the best innovators, because they could use their
profits to fund further innovative activity. Small competitive frmns, on the other hand, would not
be able to generate as much profit as monopolistic firms; thus they are unable to invest in
innovative activity.
Many contemporary economists have explored the validity and implications of the
"Schumpeter hypothesis." Several analysts in later years support the view that large firms are
better innovators, although with somewhat different explanations. Caves (1982), for instance,
argues that innovators have to choose to operate on a large scale to maximize the potential profits
that are generated from innovations. Because innovations are essentially knowledge and
information, which have the unique properties of increasing returns to scale and quasi-public
goods, innovators have to retain the ownership of the knowledge-based assets as long as
possible. Such ownership, however, cannot be fully protected by the intellectual property rights
legislation. Innovators, therefore, have to produce their products on a very large scale. A model
of R&D cost spreading, developed by Cohen and Klepper (1996), shows that there is an
advantage to large size in R&D.
Many analysts have empirically supported this hypothesis. For example, Scherer (1980)
notes that scale economies in production may provide scope economies for R&D. Particularly in
capital-intensive and advertising intensive industries, larger firms are more advantageous than
smaller firms to exploit the profits gained from innovation. In a more recent study, Damanpour
(1992) finds that firm size is positively related to innovation, particularly in manufacturing firms.
There are other analysts who think and prove otherwise. Geroski (1994) shows in his
study of British firms from 1945 to 1983 that monopolistic industries are less innovative than
competitive ones. Also, in a recent study of Swiss manufacturing fins, Arvanitis (1997) finds
no significant evidence for the existence of economies of scale in the innovation activity.
A unified and refined view seems more convincing that the effects of firm size depend on
the particular industry. Scherer (1992) later modified his previous argument, and admits that it is
not clear whether there is an absolute advantage of large, monopolistic corporations in
innovation. Large monopolistic fmns may be more advantageous than small firms to carry out
certain types of innovative activities, and vice versa.
On the other hand, the literature is still scarce on the relationship between income
distribution and firm size. One possible mechanism is the redistributive policy. As argued by
Amsden (2001), governments in countries with highly unequal income distribution are reluctant
to promote the formation of large fmns due to political reasons. If large frmns are indeed more
innovative than small firms, as argued by many analysts, then a redistributive policy that aims to
correct income inequality by discouraging the formation of large firms, in effect, could lead to
few innovations.
I have so far proposed the possible mechanisms through which income distribution may
affect innovation. In the following chapter, I test empirically the causal relationship between
income distribution and innovation. Due to data availability, I choose to test only two
mechanisms through which income distribution may affect innovation: namely, fmancial-sector
development, and credit-markets imperfection.
CHAPTER 3
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I explore empirically the relationship between income distribution and
innovation. I first present some descriptive evidence on the relevant variables, including research
and development (R&D) expenditures, then I conduct a formal, empirical analysis using
econometric methods. I discuss the basic methodological framework, the testable hypotheses, the
data and measurement of variables, and the econometric issues in the regression analysis. In the
econometric analysis, I test the hypothesis that income distribution affects the level of
expenditure on innovative activity, the level of innovative outputs, and the productivity of
innovative outputs.
I. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The patterns of income distribution vary greatly in different countries. Table 3.1 shows
the summary of descriptive statistics of the full-sample data. It is clear that there is a huge gap
between the country with the highest GINI-coefficient, South Africa, and the one with lowest
GINI, Czech Republic. The same is true for the other measure of income distribution, i.e., the
aggregate income share of the 2"d, 3 rd, and 4th quintile of the population (MID60), as well as
other variables shown in the same table. There are wide gaps in terms of gross R&D
expenditures (GERD) and private R&D expenditures (PERD), level of innovation (PTENT), and
productivity of innovation (PTENTCAP). Particularly striking is the difference in the level and
productivity of innovation. Using patent applications to measure the level of innovation, I find
that the most innovative country, Japan, has more than 360,000 patent applications per year,
while Zambia and many other countries excluded from the sample have none. In terms of
innovative productivity, measured by patent applications per million inhabitants, there are also
huge differences among countries. Japan is the most productive in producing innovations, with
more than 2,800 patent applications per million inhabitants, whereas the average productivity for
the sample of 72 countries is only 250.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Income Distribution and Innovation Measures
Standard Number of
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
Income Distribution
GINI 37.85 10.25 22.88 60.90 72
MID60 51.62 14.86 32.30 56.30 72
Innovation Spending
GERD 1.07 0.89 0.07 3.76 64
PERD 0.57 0.64 0.00 2.37 57
Innovative Output/ Productivity
PTENT 12,031 46,830 1 360,364 72
PTENTCAP 250 493 0 2,853 72
Notes: i) See Table 3.4 for definition of variables.
ii) Numbers of observations vary according to data availability.
To show the differences, I present the statistics by region in Table 3.2. Industrialized
countries, on average, have more equal income distribution and larger middle-class population
than developing countries. Among developing countries in the sample, the average income
distribution in Eastern Europe is the most equal, followed by Asia. In fact, Eastern European
countries are, on average, more equal than industrialized countries, possibly because of the
legacy from the era of socialism. As is well known, income distribution in Latin America is very
skewed and is the most unequal of all regions. In terms of R&D expenditures, industrialized
countries clearly spend much more than developing countries. Among developing countries, both
the gross and private R&D expenditures in Asia are higher than in other regions. This is also true
in terms of innovative output and productivity. The total number of patent applications, and the
number of patent applications per one million inhabitants are the greatest in industrialized
countries, followed by the groups of countries in Asia and Eastern Europe.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics by Region
Region Industrialized Asia
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Income Distribution
GINI 32.30 4.80 38.93 6.67
MID60 55.18 10.24 58.76 23.71
Innovation Spending
GERD 1.88 0.85 0.81 0.86
PERD 1.02 0.63 0.53 0.80
Innovative Output
PTENT 32,198 81,162 86,15 17,019
PTENTCAP 539 586 373 718
Number of Countries
in Sample 22 13
Note: See Table 3.4 for definition of variables.
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1999, United Nations Educational,
Developing Countries
Latin America Eastern Europe
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
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Regarding the sources of funding for research and development, developed countries
clearly rely more on funding from the private sector (Table 3.3). On average, more than half of
the gross R&D expenditures in developed countries comes from private enterprises. In contrast,
developing countries rely on the public sector, with more than 50% of R&D expenditure from
their respective governments. Among developing countries, there are clear differences among
regions. Latin America relies heavily on public sources, while its R&D funding from the private
sector is extremely low. Africa's reliance on overseas funding is also striking, with 35% coming
from overseas. The only group of developing countries with spending patterns similar to
developed countries is the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of Asia. On average, 40% of
their R&D funding comes from business enterprises, a level not far below that of developed
countries. On the other hand, research and development in the newly industrializing countries of
Latin America relies mainly on funding from the governments.
Table 3.3: Sources of Funds for Research and Development by Region, 1999
Number of Sources of Funds
countries in Education and
sample Business Non-profit
Enterprises Government Organizations Overseas
Developed countries 22 50.4 40.2 3.0 6.5
Developing countries 55 20.1 53.4 14.9 5.3
Eastern Europe 16 28.5 59.9 5.5 6.2
Asia 16 27.7 60.6 7.6 4.1
- NICS 7 40.4 41.4 12.3 5.9
Latin America 12 7.1 77.8 5.5 9.7
- NICS 4 21.0 69.7 5.1 4.2
Africa 11 7.0 49.2 0.9 35.0
- w/o South Africa 10 3.0 54.8 0.9 31.9
Note: NICS = Newly Industrialization Countries. In this sample, Asian NICS include South Korea, Singapore, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand. Latin American NICS include Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and
Argentina.
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1999. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
II. HYPOTHESIS AND ESTIMATION APPROACH
Within the conceptual framework that I formulated in Chapter 2, my main hypothesis is
that countries with more equal income distribution are more innovative than those with less equal
income distribution. Specifically, I hypothesize that countries with more equal income
distribution (1) spend more on innovative activity; (2) produce more innovative outputs, and (3)
are more productive in creating innovations.
I select variables to conduct a cross-country comparison, using countries as the units of
analyses. I specify multiple linear regression models, employing the Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) estimation method. I calibrated several sets of models according to the hypotheses that I
plan to analyze. Each set of the models contains three sub-models that use different sets of data:
(1) for all 72 countries in the sample; (2) for 22 developed countries; and (3) for 50-53
developing countries, depending on data availability. Appendix I presents the list of countries in
the sample.
An economic problem that may occur in a multivariate regression analysis is the issue of
multicollinearity. When two or more of the independent variables are highly correlated with each
other, the precision decreases with which parameters can be estimated. The existence of
multicollinearity also increases the estimates of the variances of the parameters (Gujarati 1995).
To identify whether the problem exists in the estimations, I calculate the Tolerance index and the
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The general criterion is that the lower the Tolerance index or the
higher the VIF, the more serious the problem of multicollinearity.
III. INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INNOVATION INVESTMENT
In this section, I test the hypothesis that income distribution affects the investment on
innovative activity.
1. Variables and Data
Below are the descriptions of the dependent and independent variables and data that I use
in the econometric analysis. I list the summary of variables in Table 3.4.
Dependent Variables: Expenditure on Innovative Activity
Economists have recognized for some time that a major obstacle to examining the causes
and effects of innovation in economic processes is the lack of meaningful measures of innovative
inputs and outputs. Some measures are better than others but are not readily available. In this
study, I choose several measures for innovative inputs and outputs, based mainly on data
availability.
To test the impact of income distribution on the investment on innovative activity, I use
R&D expenditures as the measure for innovation. This measure is widely used in many studies at
the firm level (e.g., Scherer 1965) and those at the country level (e.g., Amsden and Mourshed
1997). One problem in using R&D spending as the measure for innovation in a cross-country
study is that not all countries are like the United States, which requires that firms disclose their
R&D expenditures. Some firms may want to keep their R&D expenditures confidential.
Morck and Yeung (2001) raise another possible problem, namely that R&D expenditures
do not necessarily lead to innovation. The observation might be true, but I should note that firms
might consider the expenditure as investment risks, which are already taken into account in the
decision to invest in innovative activity. R&D expenditures, therefore, are still a valid measure of
innovative activity.
In this study, I use two types of data available at the country level: (1) gross domestic
expenditures on R&D as the percentage of GDP (GERD); and (2) private sector's expenditures
on R&D as the percentage of GDP (PERD). I obtain these data from the Statistical Yearbook of
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), using the
most recent data (1990-1998).
Independent Variables: Income distribution
There are a number of ways to measure income distribution. Commonly used measures
are: (a) indices of income concentration; and (b) shares of aggregate income received by
households. In this study, I use both types of measures.
First, I use Gini coefficients. This is the most widely used measure of income distribution
in empirical work. The closer the coefficient is to one, the more unequal is the country's income
distribution. I obtained the data for Gini coefficients from the World Income Inequality Database
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) available from the website:
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wwwwiid.htm. Due to availability of data, I use the most recent
data available for 1990-1996.
Different measures of income distribution are based on different theoretical concepts. As
discussed earlier, although GINI coefficients are the most widely used measure of income
distribution, there are some circumstances under which a GINI coefficient is not the appropriate
measure. For instance, it is inappropriate to compare two patterns of income distribution based
on GINI coefficients, when their Lorenze curves intersect. In other words, two different patterns
of income distribution could have the same GINI coefficients. Furthermore, the GINI
coefficients cannot fully capture the changes in income shares between groups.
In addition to the GINI-coefficients, I use the middle-class share, i.e., the share of
aggregate income of the middle-class population. Several analysts have used a couple of
variations of this measure, namely, the aggregate income of the 2 nd 3 d. and 4 th quintiles of the
population (MID60) (e.g., Easterly 2001), and that of the 3d and 4 h quintiles (MID40) (e.g.,
Persson and Tabellini 1994).
Although this measure is likely to be highly correlated with Gini coefficients, it directly
measures the size of the middle-class population. Countries with similar GINI coefficients may
have different sizes of middle-class population. The larger the middle class population, the
greater is the country's equality. Although I expect this measure to yield the same result as Gini
coefficients, I use the measure to test the robustness of the empirical model. The data for the
income share are available from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Control Variable 1: Income Level
So far, I have reviewed the literature that suggests that factors at the firn and industry
levels may affect the demand level, thereby influencing the rate and direction of industrial
innovation. Other variables that may also affect innovation include population size, population
density, and income level. I use these factors as the control variables in the empirical analysis of
the impact of income distribution on innovation.
The first control variable is income level. According to Engel's law, poor people spend
most of their income on food, clothes, and other subsistence goods. It is only when their income
rises above a certain level that they can afford similar products with better quality and more
diverse kinds of products. Furthermore, according to the quality-ladder hypothesis, consumers
value product quality and quality improvement according to their income levels. As quality
improvement requires some sort of innovation on the producers' part, I hypothesize that the
higher the income level, the higher the consumer demand for innovative products and the more
investment on innovative activity to produce those products. More innovation investment then
results in a greater number of innovation outputs than less innovation investment. I expect a
positive sign for the estimate of variable. I obtain the data from the World Bank's World
Development Report 1999.
Control Variable 2: Market size
In order for increasing-returns innovation to break even, sales must be high enough for
innovators to recoup fixed initial costs. Income inequality may affect innovation, in that the
product demand is too low for innovators to achieve a minimum efficiency scale. This means
market size can be another important factor that influences entrepreneurs to invest in innovative
activity. I use three measures for market size. The first measure is Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). The larger the size of an economy, the higher the potential demand for innovation. The
second measure is population size. A large population size suggests a potentially large market for
innovation. Minimum efficiency scale is likely to be achieved with larger population. The third
measure is population density. Concentrated population may help to create a large market for
innovation, because consumers of innovation live within the same areas, thereby reducing
transportation costs. For all three variables, I obtain the data from the World Development Report
1999.
There are other reasons for including population and population density as the additional
control variables. The literature suggests two general views regarding the effect of population on
innovation. First is the demand-driven view. Analysts argue that high population density creates
relative scarcity of resources, hence the necessity for innovation. In other words, "necessity is the
mother of invention." Boserup (1981) empirically tests this argument, focusing on the
relationship between population density and innovative practices in agriculture. Lee (1988) later
proposes a mathematical model that captures the interaction between induced population growth
and induced technical progress. Although the demand-driven argument seems logical, a caveat
exists. As argued by Ray (1998), population growth can be attributed mainly to income growth,
and it is a combination of both population and income that is likely to drive innovation, not just
population alone.
The second view is supply-driven. Analysts hold that large population size means a large
pool of potential innovators and therefore a large stock of ideas and innovations. The larger the
population, the higher is the probability that the society will be able to innovate. This argument
assumes that everybody has an independent chance of developing an innovative idea.
This view is implicit in several models of endogenous technological change, such as that
of Grossman and Helpman (1991). As Romer (1990) points out, the cost of inventing a new
technology is independent of the number of people who use it. In other words, technology is non-
rival. Given the non-rivalry of technology and an assumed constant share of resources devoted to
research and development, an increase in population will lead to an increase in technological
change. Based on that proposition, Kremer (1993) shows empirically that among the societies
without technological transfers from other societies, those with larger initial populations have
had faster technological change.
Control Variable 3: Demand Growth
Innovators may decide to invest more on innovative activities if they can expect the
demand for their innovation to grow in the future. This expectation is based on the growth trend
in the past. In this study, I use three different measures for demand growth: (1) GDP growth
(GDPGRWTH), (2) average annual growth of industry value added (INDGRWTH), and (3)
average annual growth of household final consumption expenditure (CSMGRWTH). I expect
positive signs for the estimated coefficients. I obtained all three sets of data for 1990-1998 from
the World Development Report 1999.
Table 3.4: Summary of Variables
Variable Concept Measure Year Source
Innovation
PTENT
PTENTCAP
GERD
PGERD
Income Distribution
GINI
MID40
MID60
Income Level
INCOME
Market Size
GDP
POP
POPDENSE
Demand Growth
GDPGRWTH
INDGRWTH
CSMGRWTH
Capital! Credit-Market
Imperfections
FINDEV
CREDIT
Level of innovative
output
Productivity of
innovative output
Total investment in
innovative activities
Private investment in
innovative activities
Income distribution
Middle class share
Middle class share
Income level
Economy size
Population size
Population density
Economic growth
Industrial growth
Demand growth
Financial-sector
development
Credit-market
imperfection
Total number of patent
applications by residents
Total number of patent
applications by residents per
million inhabitants
Gross expenditure on R&D as
percentage of GDP
Private expenditure on R&D as
percentage of GNP
Gini coefficient in percentage
Share of aggregate income of the
ndrd t
2", 3rd, and 4th quintiles
Share of aggregate income of the
3rd, and 4th quintiles
GDP per capita
1999
1999
WIPO
WIPO
1990-1998 UNESCO
1990-1998 UNESCO
1990-1998 UNDP
1990-1998 World Bank
1990-1998 World Bank
1998
GDP
Population size in 100 millions
Population per square kilometer
GDP growth
Average annul growth of industry
value added
Average annual growth of
household final consumption
expenditure
Ratio of liquid liabilities (in this
study, the sum of money and
quasi-money) to GDP
Credits from the banking system to
non-financial private sector as a
share of GDP
1998
1998
1999
1990-1998
1990-1998
World Bank
World Bank
World Bank
World Bank
World Bank
World Bank
1990-1998 World Bank
1997
1997
IMF
IMF
Sources: Industrial Property Statistics 2000, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); Statistical Yearbook
1999, United Nations Educational and Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO); World Income Inequality
Database, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) available from the website:
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wwwwiid.htn; World Development Report 1999, World Bank. International
Financial Statistics 1998, International Monetary Fund.
2. Econometric Estimation and Results
In the first set of regressions, the dependent variable is the gross expenditure on R&D as
percentage of GDP (GERD). The basic specification to be estimated in this section is
GERD = a+ Ql, GINI + p2 INC + 3 GDP + #4 POP +,u
The regressors are Gini coefficients in percentage term (GINI), per capita GDP, GDP,
and population size (POP).
Column 2 of Table Al in Appendix II presents the first results of the full sample. As
expected, income distribution (GINI) has a strong negative impact on gross R&D expenditures
(GERD). Income level (INCOME) also shows a significant positive effect on GERD. For the
variables that represent domestic market sizes, the estimate for GDP is positive and significant at
the 0.1 level, whereas POP is insignificant. In a comparison of the standardized coefficients of all
independent variables, I find that income level (INCOME) exerts the strongest effect on GERD.
In fact, this result is true for all regressions conducted in this study.
In each of the models 2, 3, and 4, I add an additional variable, representing demand
growth to test the hypothesis that innovators consider the growth prospect of the market when
deciding the R&D expenditures. As mentioned earlier, I use three measures to represent the
concept, namely (1) GDP growth (GDPGRWTH), (2) average annual growth of household final
consumption expenditure (CSMGRWTH), and (3) average annul growth of industry value added
(INDGRWTH). None of the estimates for the three variables shows significant results. This
means the market or demand growth at the macro level does not affect the R&D expenditures.
In Model 5, I add population density as the variable that may affect the gross innovation
expenditures. As expected, the estimate for POPDENSE is positive and significant. Moreover,
the adjusted R-square is higher than for the other equations, suggesting that POPDENSE should
be included in the estimation. However, the sign for the estimate is negative, which is contrary to
the hypothesis that the more densely populated a country is, the more innovative it is. On the
other hand, in Model 6, the estimate for urbanization rate (URBAN), as measured by the share of
urban population to total population, is insignificant.
Although some independent variables appear to be correlated, diagnostic statistics,
namely the Tolerance factor and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), do not indicate the presence
of serious multicollinearity in the estimation.
3. Alternative Measures of Income Distribution
The regressions that adopt alternative measures of income distribution yield somewhat
different estimation results (Models 7 and 8, Table Al, and Table A3 in Appendix II). Although
the estimate for the independent variable MID60 shows a positive and significant result, the
estimate for MID40 does not. Only INCOME shows the same result as in those equations that
use GINI as the measure of income distribution. This means that the decision of whether to
accept the hypothesis that societies with larger middle-class population spends more on R&D
than those with smaller middle-class population depends on the measure of income distribution
in the regression analysis.
4. Stages of Development
I further analyze the issue of whether income distribution affects innovative investment in
developing countries in the same way as in industrialized countries. I divide the full sample into
two sub-samples: one is for 22 developed countries, and the other is for 42 developing countries.
I then run the regressions with similar sets of variables as in the case of full sample.
The estimate results show clear differences between devebped and developing countries
(Table A2, Appendix II). The variables GINI, INCOME, GDP, and POPDENSE are significant
only in the models for developing countries sub-samples.
On the other hand, when I use the income share variables (MID40 and MID60) as the
measure of income distribution, the estimates are significant only for INCOME and POPDENSE
in developing countries. The estimates for income distribution measures are insignificant. This
means that the impact of income distribution on gross R&D expenditures is sensitive to the
choice of measure. It is possible that the impact is better captured by a measure that reflects
overall income distribution (e.g., GINI) than a measure that is based on income share of the
population (e.g., MID60).
5. Private R&D Expenditures
In the previous sections, I used gross R&D expenditures (GERD) as the measure for
investment on innovative activity. This measure includes all sources of funding from domestic
public and private institutions, as well as overseas sources. Much of the R&D expenditures from
the public and non-profit sectors may not necessarily be driven by profits and business
opportunities. According to the conceptual framework defined in Chapter 2, the effect of income
distribution on innovation is based on the assumption that entrepreneurs are driven by business
profits. This means GERD as an investment measure may not capture the actual effects on
investment incentives on R&D expenditures.
In light of the above observation, I specify another set of models, in which I use private
R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP (PERD) as the measure of aggregate investment on
research and development. I use PERD as the dependent variable.
The estimate results appear to be very similar to the results when using GERD as the
dependent variable (Table A4, Appendix II). All the estimates for the key variables, namely
GINI, INCOME, and GDP are significant, and the signs for coefficients are as expected. Other
control variables, i.e., POP, POPDENSE, and GDPGRWTH, are not significant.
Furthermore, neither of the estimates for MID40 and MID60 is significant. These results
suggest that the size of middle-class population, as represented by their income share, does not
affect innovative investment. Rather, it is the overall pattern of income distribution, as captured
by GINI coefficients, that has significant impact on aggregate investment in innovative activity.
The effects of income distribution on private R&D expenditures are more conspicuous in
developing countries than in developed countries. The estimates for GINI, INCOME, and GDP
are all significant in the regressions that use the developing countries sub-sample (Table A5,
Appendix II). Only INCOME is significant for the developed countries sub-sample. Among
other control variables, population density (POPDENSE) is significant at the 0.1 level for only
developing countries.
On the other hand, the alternative measures of income distribution, i.e., MID40 and
MID60, do not show any significant effects on private R&D expenditures. The results are the
same as when using GERD as the dependent variable (Table A4, Appendix II).
In sum, the estimation results indicate that income distribution, income level, the size of
the economy, and population density are the significant determinants of innovation. However,
income distribution, the size of the economy, and population density affect innovation
expenditures only for developing countries. Income level affects R&D expenditures in both
developed and developing countries.
IV. INNOVATION OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY
In this section, I test the hypothesis that income distribution affects the investment on
innovation output and productivity.
1. Variables and Data
I have thus far investigated the impact of income distribution on innovative investment.
In this section, I focus on the effects of income distribution on the level of innovative outputs. To
test the hypothesis that income distribution affects innovative outputs, I use the total number of
patent applications in one year (PTENT) as the dependent variable. The independent variables
are the same as in the regressions in the previous sections.
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a patent is an
exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a product or a process that provides a new way
of doing something, or offers a new technical solution to a problem. Admittedly, patents are not
perfect as the measure for innovative outputs. First, not all innovations are patented and certain
industries tend to patent more than others (Amsden and Mourshed 1997). Moreover, from an
economic perspective, not all patents can be considered innovations, which are supposed to have
some economic value. According to Shepherd (1979), most of the patents issued each year are
worthless and never used. Second, as Shepherd further points out, there is a problem of
"blocking," in which firms file numerous patents on variants of the original patent, not because
these are new innovations, but because they could block a competitor's attempt to circumvent the
original patent. Third, different patent laws in different countries may affect cross-country
comparisons. Some types of innovation, such as biological innovations, are not patentable in
many countries.
A better measure of innovation output is innovation counts, which are actual numbers of
innovations produced by firms. In this United States, this information is available for each four-
digit Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC), or currently the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS), from the U.S. Small Business Administration. Unfortunately,
the data are not available for other countries to conduct a cross-country comparison.
Constrained by data availability, in this study, I use the number of patent applications
filed by a country's residents as the proxy of innovative outputs. I use the total number of patent
applications, instead of the number of granted patents, because it is more relevant to the
theoretical basis of the argument. The criteria and process of granting patents are independent of
the mechanism through which income distribution affects investment incentives and innovative
outputs. Patent applications, on the other hand, reflect innovators' wish to recoup their
investment in producing the new products or processes.
2. Estimation Results
With the full sample, the estimate results show that GDP as the measure for market size
is the only significant determinant of the absolute number of patent applications in a country
(Table A7, Appendix II). Income distribution and income level do not affect the absolute level of
innovation output.
However, when I divide the full sample into two sub-samples as I have done before, other
independent variables become significant as well (Table A8, Appendix II). GDP remains
significant in all regressions, suggesting its robustness of the estimates. Other dependent
variables, i.e., GINI, POP, and POPDENSE are also significant for the developing countries sub-
sample, suggesting that market size, population density, and income distribution have a
significant impact on innovative output. Nevertheless, the R-squares are very low for the
estimates for developing countries sub-sample, with less than 30% of the variation explained by
the regressions.
It is noteworthy that the estimates for the variable POP are significant, whereas in the
equations where I regressed POP on GERD and PERD, the estimates were not significant.
However, the sign of the coefficient is negative, suggesting that population size has a negative
impact on innovative output. This result is consistent with the argument by Ray (1988) that,
when innovation level also depends on income level, a larger population size could lead to a
lower level of innovation output.
3. Innovation Productivity
I now turn to the effect of income distribution on innovation productivity as measured by
patent applications per million inhabitants. The hypothesis is that income distribution and other
independent variables affect not only the absolute level of innovative output, but also the
productivity of it. I specify another set of regression equations that use research productivity as
the dependent variable. Here I use the number of patent applications per million inhabitants as
the proxy for innovative productivity.
The estimate results for the full sample regressions indicate that INCOME is a significant
determinant of research productivity (Table A9, Appendix II). According to the literature I have
reviewed earlier, the results for INCOME are as expected, where research productivity is a
function of the level of income. The interesting result is that the estimates for POP are not
significant, but those for POPDENSE are. This suggests that it is not population size, but
population density that matters.
The estimates for the regressions using two sub-samples show yet other interesting
results. INCOME remains significant in most regressions, suggesting its robustness as the
determinant of innovative productivity (Table A10, Appendix II). The estimates for GINI and
POPDENSE are significant only in the case of the developing countries sub-sample. The
estimate for GDP is significant with a positive sign for the developed countries sub-sample,
while POP is also significant but with a negative sign.
In sum, the estimation results show that income distribution and population density affect
innovation outputs and innovation productivity only in developing countries. The size of
economic activity and population size affect innovation outputs in both developed and
developing countries. Income level affects innovation productivity in both developed countries
and developing countries.
V. CAPITAL/CREDIT MARKETS AND INNOVATION
I have tested the causal relationship between income distribution and R&D expenditure,
output level, and innovative productivity. I have not yet explored the specific mechanisms
through which income inequality affects these measures of innovation. In this section I analyze
two of the mechanisms that I proposed in Chapter 2: namely, the effect of income distribution
and financial-sector development on innovation, and the effect of income distribution and credit-
market imperfections on innovation.
1. Variables and Data
I specify another set of models that incorporate two additional variables: one is for
financial sector development (FINDEV) and the other is the interaction between income
distribution and financial development (GINI*FINDEV).
Following King and Levine (1993), I use the size of the formal financial intermediary
sector relative to economic activity to measure financial sector development, or "financial
depth." I assume that the size of financial intermediaries is positively related to the provision of
financial services. For financial depth, I use the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Liquid
liabilities include currency and demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonblank
financial intermediaries. By definition, liquid liabilities equal to "M3" or line 551 from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s International Financial Statistics 1999. However, this
information is not available for most countries. Therefore, I use instead the sum of money and
quasi-money (lines 34 and 35), which equals to M2. The data is for 1997.
The second additional variable is the interaction term between income distribution and
financial-sector development. I have noted earlier that income distribution and financial-sector
development are related, and both factors could jointly affect innovation. In other words, there is
an interaction effect between income distribution and financial sector development. I include this
variable in one of the regressions.
2. Estimation Results
I regress the variable FIDV and other independent variables on gross expenditure on
R&D (GERD). The estimate results indicate that, in addition to income distribution (GINI),
income level (INCOME), and size of economic activity (GDP), financial-sector development
also has a significant impact on expenditure on innovative activity (GERD) in developing
countries, but not in developed countries (Table Al 1, Appendix II). However, contrary to what I
have expected, the sign for the estimate is negative, contradicting the hypothesis that the more
developed a country's financial sector, the more it spends on research and development. I also
obtain similar results from another set of models, using private expenditure on R&D (PERD) as
the dependent variable.
I also run another regression that incorporates the interaction term between income
distribution and financial development. None of the estimates for GINI, FINDEV, and the
interaction term GINI*FINDEV is significant. A possible interpretation of the results is that
income distribution does not have much effect on financial-sector development, which in turn
does not have a significant impact on innovative spending. It seems, however, that the real
problem may lie in the inadequacy of the measure I use as the proxy for financial development.
3. Credit Market Imperfections
I further explore the effect of income distribution on innovation through a different aspect
of financial-sector development, i.e., credit-market imperfections. As I reviewed earlier, when
potential entrepreneurs cannot borrow against future income, the initial distribution of income
has consequences for physical and capital accumulation. As an extension of this argument, I
hypothesize that credit market imperfections also affect innovation. Following Smith (2001), the
measure that I use in this study to represent credit market imperfections is credits from the
banking system to non-financial private sector as a share of GDP (CREDIT). This measure
reflects the borrowing constraints on the part of consumers and firms. I obtain the data from the
IMF's International Financial Statistics 1997 (line 32a).
The estimate results are the same as those of the regressions that use financial sector
development as the independent variable (Table A12, Appendix II). While GINI, INCOME, and
GDP all remain significant for developing countries, the estimate for CREDIT is insignificant. I
further evaluate the interaction between income distribution and credit market imperfections by
including the interaction term in a regression (Model 3, Table A12). The results still suggest that
credit-market imperfection is not a significant factor that determines expenditure on innovative
activity.
It appears that neither of the proxies for financial/credit market imperfections can capture
the effects of financial market on innovation. It is clear that better measures are necessary for
credit market imperfections and financial development.
VI. INPUTS AND OUTPUTS OF INNOVATION
Finally, I test the relationship between inputs and outputs of innovative activity. I follow
others (Scherer 1982; Acs and Audertsch 1988) in assuming that innovative outputs are related to
innovation-inducing inputs in the previous period according to a log relationship. I run two
separate sets of regressions, using the log values of total number of patents, and the log values of
total number patents per one million inhabitants, as the dependent variables. The estimated
coefficients suggest that the number of scientists and engineers, and gross R&D expenditures
significantly affect the level and productivity of innovation outputs in both developed and
developing countries (Tables A13 and A14, Appendix II). Private R&D expenditures, however,
affect innovation only in developed countries. This is not surprising, considering that in most
developing countries, private finms do not invest in innovation, not to mention their lack of
innovative capability.
In a comparison of the standardized coefficients of all independent variables, I find that
private R&D expenditures exert the strongest effect on innovation outputs and innovation
productivity in developed countries. On the other hand, in developing countries, the number of
scientists and engineers has the strongest effect on innovation outputs, and gross R&D
expenditures have the strongest effect on innovation productivity.
V11. RESULTS SUMMARY
The econometric results suggest that countries with more equal income distribution spend
more on innovative activity, produce more innovative outputs, and are more productive in
producing innovations than those with less equal income distribution. Other significant
determinants of innovation include income level, the size of economic activity, and population
density.
However, the effects of income distribution on innovation are limited to developing
countries. Income distribution, the size of the economy, and population density significantly
affect innovation expenditures only in developing countries. Income level affects R&D
expenditures in both developed and developing countries.
Regarding the determinants of innovation output level, income distribution affects only
developing countries, whereas the size of economic activity affects both developed and
developing countries. Income level is not a significant factor in determining the level of
innovation output.
As for innovation productivity, income level is significant for both developed and
developed countries, while income distribution and population density affect only developing
countries. The size of economic activity is not a significant determinant of innovation
productivity. Table 3.5 shows the summary of the key estimation results.
Table 3.5: Summary of Key Estimation Results
Income Population
Income Level Distribution GDP Size Density
Innovation Investment
Full sample 4 4 4 4
Developed Countries 4 x x x
Developing Countries 9 1 4 4
Innovation Outputs
Full Sample x x 4 x
Developed Countries x x x
Developing Countries x .4 4
Innovation Productivity
Full Sample 4 x x
Developed Countries 4 x x x
Developing Countries 4x 4
Note: 4 signifies significant estimation results. "x" signifies insignificant results.
Furthermore, in the analysis of the mechanisms through which income distribution affects
innovation, I do not find a significant relationship among income distribution, financial-sector
development, and innovation. Nor did I find the relationship among income distribution, credit-
market imperfections, and innovation.
Finally, the analyses of the relationship between inputs and outputs of innovation suggest
that countries with more personnel in research and development and greater gross R&D
expenditures have higher output level and are more productive in creating innovations than those
with less of each of these factors. Private-sector expenditure on innovation is a significant
determinant of innovative output level and innovative productivity only in developed countries.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
The empirical results have confirmed my hypothesis that income distribution affects
innovation investment, innovation output, and innovation productivity. Other factors, such as
income level, size of economic activity, and population density, are also significant determinants
of technological innovations. I also find that these factors affect developed and developing
countries differently. Particularly interesting is the result that income distribution affects
innovation only in developing countries.
The reason why income distribution has an effect only on developing countries is closely
related to the unique properties of innovations. As reviewed earlier, innovations are in essence
knowledge and information. According to the Romer (1990), knowledge has the unique
properties of aggregate increasing returns to scale owing to externalities, and displays increasing
marginal productivity. These properties suggest that innovations require minimum scale of
production to break even, and therefore require minimum size of market.
Furthermore, because of high fixed costs in research and development, entrepreneurs who
invest in innovative activity would want to recoup their investment by charging high prices for
their innovations. Particularly when intellectual property rights are not well protected, innovators
would charge high prices to break even before competitors imitate their products. The
entrepreneurial rents demanded by innovators would result in high prices for the new products in
the market. This property of innovation suggests that consumers must have a minimum level of
income to afford innovations.
When innovations have such properties, income distribution affects innovation
investment only in developing countries, because it affects the size of the market. According to
Sokoloff (1988), in the absence of property rights incentives, the size of the market is the most
important determinant of the rate of growth of technological innovation. The empirical results in
this study add income distribution and income level to the list of determinants. Because the
average income level in developing countries is low, the size of market for innovations is small.
Income distribution affects the aggregate demand compositions and further affects the sizes of
domestic markets for innovations. This is why developing countries with more equal income
distribution are more innovative than those with less equal income distribution, other things
being equal.
On the other hand, in the case of developed countries, the average income level is
relatively high. The size of the market is therefore large enough to accommodate innovations.
The effect of income distribution on innovation is therefore insignificant.
Furthermore, on the supply side, the production of innovations presumably requires a
minimum level of knowledge and human capital, which is arguably the most important
determinant of innovation output and productivity. Developing countries in general are situated
below the required level, and developed countries are above it. This implies that once a country
has accumulated human capital beyond the required level, income distribution does not affect the
process of human capital accumulation, which could affect innovation.
There is another reason why income distribution affects the level of innovation outputs
and innovation productivity only in developing countries. As knowledge displays increasing
marginal productivity, the production of innovations from increased knowledge demonstrates
increasing returns. This means the greater the stock of knowledge a country has, the more
innovations and the more productively it can produce. The effects of income distribution on
innovation, however, are presumably proportional to the stock of human capital. This means the
larger the stock of human capital, the smaller the effect of income distribution on innovation
output and productivity. This explanation supports the finding in the previous chapter that
income distribution affects innovation output and productivity only in developing countries. In
developing countries, the stock of human capital is generally small. The effect of income
distribution on the stock of human capital and thus innovation output and productivity looms
large. On the other hand, in developed countries, the stock of knowledge and human capital is
much larger than in developing countries. The effect of income distribution on innovation output
and productivity is therefore insignificant.
In sum, income distribution has an effect only on developing countries, because
knowledge and information, the essence of innovation, have the properties of increasing returns
to scale due to externalities, and increasing marginal productivity. Income distribution affects
innovation expenditure, innovation output, and innovation productivity by affecting the
aggregate demand composition and human-capital accumulation. Because the market size and
the stock of human capital are relatively small in developing countries, income distribution has
significant effects on the size of the market, the stock of human capital, and therefore innovation.
Developed countries, on the other hand, have large markets and large stock of human capital.
Income distribution, therefore, does not significantly affect demand compositions and human-
capital accumulation, which may, in turn, affect innovation.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Although I have found a causal relationship between income distribution and innovation,
the analysis of the mechanisms through which income distribution affects innovation is still
unsatisfactory. First, limited data availability allowed me to test only two of several possible
mechanisms for income distribution to affect innovation: namely, financial-sector development
and credit-market imperfections. I have excluded other mechanisms from the empirical analysis,
such as redistributive policies that affect firm sizes, and differences in relative profit margins that
lead to sectorial concentration of investment.
Second, I did not find a significant relationship between income distribution and
financial-sector development, which could affect innovation. Nor did I find a relationship among
income distribution, credit-market imperfections, and innovation. It is still not clear whether the
insignificant results suggest that the relationships do not exist, or that the proxies I used in the
analysis are inadequate.
Third, as is often the case with an econometric model, the variables I included in the
study do not explain all variations in the sample. By dividing the full sample into two sub-
samples according to the level of development, I find that most factors have an impact only on
developing countries, but not on developed countries. It is clear, however, that even among
developed countries, there are wide gaps in terms of R&D expenditures, level of innovative
outputs, and innovation productivity. This means there must be other factors that determine the
rates and directions of innovation in developed countries in addition to the factors that I use in
this study.
This leads to another limitation of this study: namely, the restricted analytical framework.
I have restricted the empirical analysis within the neo-classical framework of economic analysis,
without taking into account the issues of property rights and other institutional factors. The
development of incentive structures through patent laws and trade secret laws could increase the
rates of returns for investment on innovative activities, thereby increasing R&D expenditures and
innovation outputs. This means institutional factors can play an important role in determining the
rates and directions of innovation.
It seems clear that any future research on the determinants of innovation needs to
incorporate institutional factors, particularly those that affect the rates of returns to investment.
Also important are institutional factors that may affect the costs to fail, which may, in turn, affect
entrepreneurship. It is possible that a society with a certain pattern of income distribution may
have a set of institutions that do not allow entrepreneurs to take risks in innovation investment.
Finally, it is important to note again that in this study I analyzed only technological
innovations, as measured by R&D expenditures and patent applications. Other types of
innovations that are not captured by the measures, such as organizational innovations, may also
be affected by income distribution. There is ample room for future research that examines the
relationship between income distribution and innovation in a broader sense than technological
innovation.
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APPENDIX I
LIST OF COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE
Developing Countries
Asia Latin America Eastern Europe Africa
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
South Korea
Malaysia
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
SriLanka
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Egypt
Ghana
Kenya
Morocco
South Africa
Zimbabwe
APPENDIX II: ESTIMATION RESULTS
Below are the tables that report the estimation results for the Ordinary Least Square
regressions. t values are shown in parentheses. SEE stands for standard error of the estimate. *
signifies p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, and * = p < 0.1
Table Al: Estimation Results for Regressions on GERD, Full Sample
Independent
variable Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Constant
GINI
INCOME
1.178*** 1.272*** 1.271*** 1.252*** 1.077*** 1.058** -0.388 0.479
(3.595) (3.741) (3.606) (3.741) (3.366) (2.693) (-0.860) (1.568)
-0.019** -0.022** -0.023** -0.021** -0.016** -0.019**
(-2.489) (-2.578) (-2.642) (-2.576) (-2.139) (-2.565)
0.050*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.058***
(6.467) (6.317) (6.228) (6.589) (7.047) (5.572) (6.508) (0.719)
0.013*
(1.733)
0.007
(0.182)
0.013*
(1.932)
0.013*
(1.796)
0.013* 0.011 0.012* 0.011
(1.819) (1.577) (1.927) (1.556)
-0.000
(0.040)
0.009
(0.120)
0.001
(0.056)
0.014
(0.725)
GDPGRWTH
CSMGRWTH
INDGRWTH
POPDENSE
0.025
(0.688)
0.008
(0.581)
-0.01*
(-1.778)
URBAN
MID60
MID40
-0.003
(0.681)
0.018*
(1.758)
-0.003
(-0.338)
Adjusted R2 0.594 0.598 0.593 0.598 0.615 0.596 0.620 0.591
SEE 0.567 0.565 0.581 0.568 0.553 0.566 0.559 0.575
F 24.060 27.384 22.499 24.405 26.115 24.260 24.703 21.971
Number of
observation 64 64 60 64 64 64 59 59
GDP
POP
Table A2: Estimation Results for Regressions on GERD, Sub-Samples
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 6.1 Model 6.2
Independent Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing
variable countries countries countries countries countries countries countries countries
Constant 1.617 1.233*** 1.595 1.165*** 1.963 0.909*** 1.128 0.994***
(1.014) (4.448) (1.074) (3.915) (1.356) (3.609) (2.665) (2.785)
GINI -0.027 -0.022*** -0.029 -0.020*** -0.034 -0.017*** -0.026 -0.020***
(-0.712) (-3.255) (-0.713) (-2.772) (-0.926) (-2.881) (-0.692) (-2.932)
INCOME 0.044 0.038*** 0.046* 0.043*** 0.048* 0.104*** 0.043 0.039**
(6.077) (2.966) (1.831) (3.331) (2.036) (4.851) (1.739) (2.608)
GDP 0.017 0.135** 0.012 0.067* 0.013 0.062* 0.015 0.072*
(1.533) (2.422) (1.166) (1.171) (1.278) (1.923) (1.131) (1.971)
POP -0.146 -0.070
(-0.104) (-1.494)
GDPGRWTH 0.017 0.006
(0.140) (0.353)
POPDENSE 
-0.002 -0.001***
(-1.278) (-3.245)
URBAN 0.006 0.003
(0.513) (0.571)
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.361 0.158 0.325 0.231 0.473 0.170 0.329
SEE 0.784 0.448 0.784 0.460 0.749 0.407 0.778 0.459
F 1.980 6.801 1.987 5.938 2.578 10.194 2.076 6.021
Number of
observation 22 42 22 42 22 42 22 42
Note: Model numbers correspond to those in Table 1.
Table A3: Estimation Results for Regression on GERD with Alternative
Measures of Income Distribution, Sub-Samples
Model 7.1 Model 7.2 Model 8.1 Model 8.2
Developed Developing Developed Developing
Independent variable countries countries countries countries
Constant -3.921 0.245 1.104 0.248
(-0.753) (0.690) (1.120) (1.047)
INCOME 0.036 0.116*** 0.052** 0.154***
(1.231) (4.094) (-0.466) (5.285)
GDP 0.016 0.024 0.010 0.019
(1.349) (0.745) (2.229) (0.670)
POPDENSE -0.017 0.001** -0.002 0.002**
(-1.186) (2.134) (0.986) (3.895)
MID60 0.095 -0.003
(0.918) (-0.357)
MID40 -0.008 -0.009
(-1.198) (-1.435)
Adjusted R2 0.204 0.559 0.201 0.555
SEE 0.765 0.366 0.764 0.341
F 2.281 12.725 2.324 12.229
Number of
observation 21 38 21 38
Note: Model numbers correspond to those in Table 1.
Table A4: Estimation Results for Regressions on PERD, Full Sample
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 0.665** 0.761 ** 0.591** -0.649 0.057
(3.595) (2.707) (2.170) (-1.250) (0.248)
GINI -0.014** -0.018** -0.012*
(-2.489) (-2.559) (-1.982)
INCOME 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.037**
(6.467) (4.714) (5.274) (4.232) (5.954)
GDP 0.012** 0.012** 0.010* 0.010** 0.009
(1.733) (2.264) (1.902) (1.850) (1.630)
POP -0.009
(0.182)
GDPGRWTH 0.014
(1.163)
POPDENSE -0.0001 0.001 0.001*
(-1.014) (1.339) (1.788)
MID60 -0.015
(1.290)
MID40 -0.002
(-0.290)
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.562 0.559 0.580 0.570
SEE 0.432 0.429 0.428 0.427 0.427
F 18.168 18.953 18.759 18.285 18.217
Number of
observation 57 57 57 52 52
Table A5: Estimation Results for Regressions on PERD, Sub-Samples
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 3.1 Model 3.2
Independent Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing
variable countries countries countries countries countries countries
Constant 1.004 0.749*** 0.738 0.798*** 0.905 0.445*
(0.981) (2.881) (1.074) (2.941) (0.935) (1.753)
GINI -0.026 -0.017*** -0.023 -0.020*** -0.027 -0.013**
(-1.034) (-2.919) (-0.713) (-3.012) (-1.094) (-2.296)
INCOME 0.034* 0.027** 0.040* 0.025** 0.042* 0.074***
(1.826) (2.425) (1.831) (2.242) (2.662) (3.579)
GDP 0.053 0.119** 0.011 0.078* 0.011 0.067*
(0.879) (2.468) (1.166) (1.899) (1.674) (1.724)
POP -1.252 -0.066
(-0.706) (-1.383)
GDPGRWTH -0.006 0.027
(0.140) (1.375)
POPDENSE -0.001 -0.0002**
(-0.839) (-2.366)
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.355 0.346 0.355 0.372 0.422
SEE 0.504 0.379 0.511 0.380 0.501 0.359
F 4.011 5.681 3.778 5.684 4.108 7.203
Number of
observation
22 35 22 35 22 35
Notes: Model numbers correspond to those in Table 4.
Table A6: Estimation Results for Regression on PERD with Alternative
Measures of Income Distribution, Sub-Samples
Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 6.1 Model 6.2
Developed Developing Developed Developing
Independent variable countries countries countries countries
Constant -3.499 -0.520 0.191 -0.185
(-1.002) (-1.461) (0.287) (-1.068)
INCOME 0.034 0.110*** -0.046** 0.114***
(1.719) (4.596) (2.889) (5.431)
GDP 0.013 0.015 0.009 0.004
(1.684) (0.468) (1.316) (0.138)
POPDENSE -0.0001 0.002*** -0.001 0.003**
(-0.684) (4.415) (-0.726) (0.138)
MID60 0.070 0.004
(1.007) (0.514)
MID40 
-0.054 -0.005
(-0.493) (-1.036)
Adjusted R2 0.332 0.559 0.338 0.685
SEE 0.513 0.366 0.515 0.246
F 3.490 12.725 3.675 17.288
Number of observation 21 31 21 31
Notes: Model numbers correspond to those in Table 4.
Table A7: Estimation Results for Regressions on PTENT, Full Sample
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant
GINI
INCOME
GDP
POP
GDPGRWTH
POPDENSE
1.205
(0.710)
-0.034
(-0.880)
0.014
(0.349)
0.323***
(7.970)
-0.136
(-0.632)
0.849
(0.476)
-0.027
(-0.637)
0.024
(0.579)
0.314***
(8.151)
1.035
(0.610)
-0.033
(-0.835)
0.019
(0.445)
0.316***
(8.063)
0.014
(-0.220)
0.000
(0.153)
Adjusted R2 0.546 0.544 0.544
SEE 3.154 3.162 3.162
F 22.386 22.182 22.168
Number of
observation 72 72 72
Table A8: Estimation Results for Regressions on PTENT, Sub-Samples
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 3.1 Model 3..2
Independent Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing
variable countries countries countries countries countries countries
Constant 15.013 1.042 5.574 0.849 2.409 0.614
(1.460) (2.255) (0.497) (1.658) (0.223) (1.658)
GINI -0.302 -0.0.27** -0.242 -0.023* -0.187 -0.020*
(-1.220) (-2.504) (-0.780) (-1.860) (-0.681) (-1.860)
INCOME -0.143 -0.017 0.098 0.032 0.074 0.095*
(-0.772) (-0.753) (-0.524) (-1.388) (-0.420) (-1.388)
GDP 0.323*** 0.364*** 0.329*** 0.216*** 0.324*** 0.205***
(3.031) (3.718) (4.156) (3.150) (4.398) (3.150)
POP -0.136** -0.163*
(-2.507) (-1.940)
GDPGRWTH -0.043 0.003
(-0.046) (-0.107)
POPDENSE 0.014 -0.0003*
(1.456) (-1.759)
Adjusted R2 0.612 0.279 0.468 0.218 0.527 0.268
SEE 5.058 0.813 5.918 0.846 5.581 0.819
F 9.270 5.729 5.623 4.422 6.852 5.495
Number of
observation 22 50 22 50 22 50
Notes: Model numbers correspond to those in Table 7.
Table A9: Estimation Results for Regressions on PTENTCAP, Full Sample
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 152.065 160.826 272.982 246.826
(0.627) (0.645) (1.058) (1.029)
GINI -4.340 -4.435 -8.044 -6.724
(-0.) (-0.774) (-1.279) (-1.198)
INCOME 26.348*** 26.100*** 24.116*** 21.498***
(4.552) (4.305) (4.009) (3.549)
GDP 6.711 7.040 7.007 8.924
(1.198) (7.183) (1.268) (1.610)
POP -5.499
(-0.174)
GDPGRWTH 18.862
(1.321)
POPDENSE 0.128**
(2.205)
Adjusted R2 0.339 0.329 0.346 0.375
SEE 460.212 463.528 457.715 447.677
F 13.139 9.722 10.398 11.630
Number of
observation 72 72 72 72
Table A10: Estimation Results for Regressions on PTENTCAP, Sub-Samples
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 3.1 Model 3.2
Independent Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing Developed Developing
variable countries countries countries countries countries countries countries countries
Constant 370.040 190.070 1196.458 226.249 371.510 280.837 139.273 63.931
(0.387) (0.916) (1.324) (1.053) (0.377) (1.234) (0.144) (0.3130
GINI -19.380 -7.663 -24.216 -8.504* -19.760 -10.003* -15.066 -6.140*
(-0.786) (-1.683) (-1.113) (-1.683) (-0.725) (-1.838) (-0.611) (-1.308)
INCOME 29.410*** 63.850*** 8.063 61.253** 29.517* 61.121*** 27.516* 100.708***
(1.859) (6.533) (-0.494) (5.833) (1.788) (6.007) (1.749) (5.583)
GDP 10.847 24.517 144.226** 49.052 10.862 12.558 10.442 16.443
(1.630) (0.844) (2.690) (1.077) (1.568) (0.512) (1.584) (0.590)
POP -3915.592** -27.416
(-2.502) (-0.702)
GDPGRWTH 82.306 15.610
(0.038) (0.973)
POPDENSE 1.022 -0.201**
(1.178) (-2.386)
Adjusted R2 0.424 0.473 0.424 0.473 0.212 0.478 0.271 0.527
SEE 444.485 378.029 444.485 378.029 519.920 376.161 499.954 358.117
F 4.865 11.993 4.865 11.993 2.412 12.225 2.955 14.650
Number of
observation 22 50 22 50 22 50 22 50
Table All: Estimates for Regressions on GERD, Financial Sector Development
Model 2.1 Model 2.2
Model I Model 2 Developed Developing Model 3
Independent variable Full sample Full sample countries countries Full sample
Constant 0.477*** 1.307 1.721 1.215*** 1.070
(2.947) (4.011) (1.172) (4.456) (1.730)
GINI -0.018** -0.023 -0.018*** -0.012
(-2.479) (-0.612) (-2.871) (-0.8199)
INCOME 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.052* 0.051*** 0.055***
(7.829) (6.701) (2.016) (3.820) (6.311)
GDP 0.010 0.012* 0.012 0.081** 0.013*
(1.507) (1.909) (1.100) (2.323) (1.862)
FINDEV -0.254 -0.428 -0.556 -0.468*** -0.078
(-0.839) (-1.612) (-0.774) (-1.835) (-0.068)
GINI*FINDEV 
-0.012
(-0.452)
Adjusted R2 0.618 0.631 0.186 0.360 0.626
SEE 0.563 0.551 0.771 0.431 0.554
F 34.403 27.981 2.199 6.770 22.124
Number of
observation 64 64 22 42 64
Table A12: Estimates for Regressions on GERD, Credit Market Imperfections
Model 1.1 Model 1.2
Model 1 Model 1 Developed Developing Model 3
Independent variable Full sample Full sample countries countries Full sample
Constant 0.477*** 1.202 1.766 1.085**8 0.894
(3.783) (4.011) (1.159) (4.430) (1.876)
GINI -0.018** -0.029 -0.017** -0.010
(-2.479) (-0.752) (-2.871) (-0.870)
INCOME 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.050* 0.051*** 0.052***
(7.313) (6.701) (1.900) (3.309) (5.174)
GDP 0.012 0.013* 0.012 0.074** 0.013*
(1.664) (1.909) (1.150) (2.076) (1.830)
CREDIT -0.329 -0.207 -0.273 -0.233 0.582
(-1.386) (-0.886) (-0.493) (-0.976) (0.628)
GINI*CREDIT -0.019
(-0.879)
Adjusted R2 0.591 0.622 0.162 0.329 0.620
SEE 0.583 0.561 0.786 0.441 0.561
F 31.314 26.871 2.012 6.018 21.569
Number of
observation 64 64 22 42 64
A13: Estimation Results for Regressions on Log of PTENT
Model 1 Model 1.1 Model 1.2
Independent variable All countries Developing countries Developed countries
Constant -0.906 0.500 -0.468
(-0.654) (0.243) (-0.317)
Log GERD 0.875** 0.910* -1.928**
(2.274) (1.818) (-2.298)
Log PERD 0.222 0.178 2.054***
(0.989) (0.661) (3.465)
Log RDPERSON 0.845*** 0.678*** 0.988***
(6.567) (3.523) (8.261)
Adjusted R2 0.767 0.593 0.893
SEE 1.154 1.323 0.659
F 56.965 15.543 56.701
Number of
observation 52 31 21
A14: Estimation Results for Regressions on Log of PTENTCAP
Model 1 Model 1.1 Model 1.2
Independent variable All countries Developing countries Developed countries
Constant -1.211 0.163 -4.040
(-0.675) (0.071) (-0.867)
Log GERD 0.992** 1.303** -1.627*
(2.364) (2.270) (-1.795)
Log PERD 0.190 0.102 1.689**
(0.843) (0.386) (2.308)
Log RDPERSON 0.817*** 0.585* 1.413**
(3.410) (1.874) (2.538)
Adjusted R2 0.757 0.638 0.776
SEE 1.164 1.346 0.650
F 54.081 18.612 24.160
Number of
observation 52 31 21
